My understanding is that usually these keys are used as a 2nd factor in 2-factor authentication schemes. In this capacity it works with Google and Dropbox, as well as a number of password managers including LastPass, dashlane, Keepass, and a number of others. Also, there’s a breakdown of some of the technical differences between models of YubiKeys.
However I was more interested in using it to store a PGP key, so that I might be able to use one PGP key on any computer I might find myself. I also wanted this PGP Key to be an RSA key of length of 4,096, so I needed either a YubiKey 4 or a YubiKey 4 Nano. As I say above, I went for the YubiKey 4.
(Note that according to the YubiKey 4’s FAQ section, “On the same YubiKey, at the same time, you can use U2F to secure your Gmail account, access services like LastPass, as well as secure your communication using applets loaded on your device, such as the OpenPGP applet.”)
The most immediate reason I wanted to be able to take my private keys with me when I left a room was that I didn’t want them on my work computer.
Note: I’m not an expert. While I think I’ve gotten pretty far with this, I don’t understand everything yet. This blog post is mostly for my personal reference of how I got this to work, while consulting a combination of tutorials written by others linked to just below. If that doesn’t sound like what you’re looking for, check out the tutorials themselves and close this tab– no hard feelings!
Note 2 (October 2017): I’ve added a note below about a security issue related to this procedure called the “Infineon RSA Key Generation Issue”. This issue was announced publicly in October of 2017. See below for more, but here’s Yubico’s page on the issue and an Ars Technica article about it.
I have a basic understanding of PGP (I also have an earlier post outlining some basics of PGP if you like), but I knew setting up and using a YubiKey would be tricky for me and I still don’t have a full grasp of it. So I spent the $40 and figured I could figure it out. Here’s what I did.
What I Did (Tutorials I Found)
There’s also this drduh gist, however it’s does everything though the command line and is done on a Linux Debian installation (not MacOS).
PGP Strategy / Goals
As mentioned above, my goal was to have one PGP key that would follow me around from computer to computer. And rather than use a regular USB key to shuttle my private keys to each computer, I figured there was a more secure option with similar portability, which seems to be what the YubiKey 4 is made for (it’s small enough to live on key chain).
So I’d make this key and put it on the YubiKey. This key pair’s public key would (hopefully) never be uploaded to a public key server. The reason I didn’t want it on any public key servers is that I’d be able to completely delete it and make a new one without having to revoke it from public key servers. When I left BuzzFeed I had to revoke the key I made and associated with my buzzfeed.com email address. Now when you search “Sam Schlinkert” on the MIT server, you see two keys:
pub 4096R/B80500F2 2015-09-16 Sam Schlinkert <email@example.com> Fingerprint=EF45 36E5 6440 EF4D 5D31 E82A 5BF6 E5C2 B805 00F2 --------------- pub 4096R/3CC91D33 2015-06-24 *** KEY REVOKED *** [not verified] Sam Schlinkert <firstname.lastname@example.org> Fingerprint=56AB EFDF 1373 7728 2394 B9FF 77D9 AF85 3CC9 1D33
As you can see, while the revoked key is relatively well labeled as “REVOKED”, it’s still there, meaning that there’d be another revoked key every time I deleted and made a new key pair for the YubiKey. If I reovked my keys frequently, this search result page would keep getting more cluttered.
That said, I still wanted to maintain a key on the public servers– ostensibly for initial contact. Since I already have a key on the servers, I figured I’d just keep that for now. (here it is on MIT’s server). I still have it linked to from my Twitter account.
My inspiration for prioritizing this ability to recycle my (relatively) more-secure key (the one on the YubiKey in this situation) frequently and easily is this blog post by Filippo Valsorda and this Gist on “Operational PGP” by @thegrugq.
In his blog post about why he’s giving up on long-term PGP, Valsorda writes:
But the real issues I realized are more subtle. I never felt confident in the security of my long term keys. The more time passed, the more I would feel uneasy about any specific key. Yubikeys would get exposed to hotel rooms. Offline keys would sit in a far away drawer or safe. Vulnerabilities would be announced. USB devices would get plugged in.
A long term key is as secure as the minimum common denominator of your security practices over its lifetime. It’s the weak link.
Worse, long term keys patterns like collecting signatures and printing fingerprints on business cards discourage practices that would otherwise be obvious hygiene: rotating keys often, having different keys for different devices, compartmentalization. It actually encourages expanding the attack surface by making backups of the key.
I learned more from thegrugq’s Gist on “Operational PGP”:
A more secure mitigation against key loss is to generate new keys frequently, use them for specific operations, and then destroy them. For example, when traveling, create a new Travel PGP Key and use that until you are back home. That way if anyone compromises your travel laptop they only breach the compartment for the duration of your travel. The impact of the compromise is contained by the limitation on the utility of the PGP key.
So – more keys, more often.
Given that the key on my YubiKey won’t be public, I would be able to recycle them often or between “operations”. So maybe every few months, or if I start using PGP more, every few weeks.
One downside to this strategy is that the key on the YubiKey won’t be very useful for authenticating myself. However I have that public-facing key linked to on my verified Twitter account as well as on my Facebook account, which I think replaces my need to have any of my PGP keys signed by members of a web of trust.
OK let’s get a new, fresh key pair on to my new YubiKey 4.
From the official tutorial I learned that, since I have a YubiKey 4, I did NOT need to change the mode to enable CCID: “Note that all YubiKey 4 devices and all YubiKey NEO devices are now shipped with CCID mode enabled by default.”
I also made sure I had the latest version of GPG Suite installed.
(For the record I’m running OS X Yosemite (10.10.5).)
I also already had an up-to-date version of GnuPG installed on my command line. When I run:
gpg --version I get the following:
gpg (GnuPG/MacGPG2) 2.0.30 libgcrypt 1.6.6 Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
gpg gives you version 1, you may have GPG version 2 but need to use
gpg2 on the command line. If running
gpg2 --version gives you a version over 2, you’ll need to use the
gpg2 command everywhere you see me use
In order to use an RSA key with a length of 4,096 with your YubiKey 4, you’ll need to use
gpg version 2 (as the tutorial notes: “If you are using a YubiKey 4 and want to work with 4096 key sizes, you need to use GPG v 2”)
A Choice: “Orphan” vs. “Mothership”
IMPORTANT SECURITY UPDATE (October 2017): A security issue has been discovered that affects, among other things, OpenPGP functionality of the YubiKey 4 platform. It’s been labeled the “Infineon RSA Key Generation Issue” by Yubico, and it comes into play in the section of this guide below. Handling and mitigating this issue is a bit over my head, but I thought I should add a note here. Please rely heavily on the links provided below and/or your own research of this issue.
From the Yubico notice on their website: Yubikey 4 / 4C / 4 nano Versions 4.2.6-4.3.4 are “possibly affected - Use of onboard RSA key generation with PIV smart card and OpenPGP card onboard RSA key generation.” Here’s how to find out what version your YubiKey is. Note that Yubico says that “Yubico has addressed this issue in all shipments of YubiKey 4, YubiKey 4 Nano, and YubiKey 4C, since June 6, 2017,” so if you bought your YubiKey after that date, you should be OK.
The mitigation strategy for OpenPGP is to generate keys outside of the YubiKey and import them onto the device. For more information refer to the Yubico Knowledge Base document “Generating the key on your local system”.
Given this mitigation advice, my understanding is that if your YubiKey is one of the affected versions, you are advised NOT to generate your PGP key on your YubiKey (a process I describe as the “orphan” method below). Instead, you should generate your GPGP keys on your computer, and then put them onto your YubiKey (a process I describe as the “mothership” method below).
If you have GPG keys that you generated on your affected YubiKey, you’re to revoke them and then trash them and generate a new pair on a device that is not your affect YubiKey (like your laptop). This process is the very one I attempt to describe below, however please convince yourself that these actions will result in key that is safe enough for you to use before proceeding. Again, I am far from an expert– I’m just outlining a procedure that worked for me.
As the official tutorial explains:
Before you begin, decide if you want to generate the private key on the YubiKey device, or if you want to generate the private key off of the YubiKey and then move the subkeys to the YubiKey. For greater security, we recommend that you store your subkeys on the device (therefore, generate your private key off of the device).
So our choices are “Generating Your OpenPGP Key Directly on your YubiKey” or “Generating the key on your local system”. I’m a little confused by the differences between these two methods. The idea of generating the key on the YubiKey makes sense to me– the YubiKey is independent of the computer we’re using, like an “orphan”. Since the other method uses the computer to generate the keys, then has us move them to the card, I think of it as the “mothership” procedure.
Given my reading of the rather cryptic sentence in the tutorial’s introduction: “For greater security, we recommend that you store your subkeys on the device (therefore, generate your private key off of the device)”, I figured the “mothership” procedure was a more secure choice.
Thus I decided to generate my private key not on my YubiKey but rather on my computer, and then move them to my YubiKey (i.e. the “mothership” procedure).
Generating a New Key Pair on my Computer
At this point, I switched to the Hudson tutorial, skipping down to the section called “Create your key”. (The reason I followed Hudson’s tutorial at this point is actually because I hadn’t found the official tutorial yet, but I’m going to keep writing this as if I meant to do all this in the order that I did it.)
Using the GPG Keychain application included in GPG Suite, I generated a new key pair as the Hudson tutorial describes. The only difference is that I specified a length of 4,096, since I knew the YubiKey 4 could handle that length. My new key’s Key ID was
03FC30EE, which will be important to have handy for the rest of this.
I also followed Hudson’s instruction to create a second subkey for signing, as he says that’s necessary when using cards (like YubiKey)– however I again made mine 4096 long:
By default GPG Keychain tool create the primary key that has all access and one encryption subkey. For the cards you need to create a second subkey for signing. Double click on your key to bring up the Key Inspector window, select Subkeys and click + to create a new one of type RSA (sign only) and of length 2048.
Since I was just learning I also did NOT export my key (in other words I did NOT “At this point you should export your key and save it somewhere safely offline.”), nor did I upload my new public key to a key server, for reasons stated above. However I did generate a revoke certificate, just in case I later uploaded the public key, either on purpose or accidentally. I saved the revoke certificate to my computer’s hard drive and an external hard drive.
Transferring Keys to the YubiKey
At this point, Hudson writes “First you need to enable the OpenPGP Card / CCID mode.” However from the official tutorial I knew I did NOT need to do this (since I have a YubiKey 4), so I skipped this step.
I went down to where he writes “Now let’s edit your public key:” (though we’re really about to edit the private keys). As instructed, in terminal I typed:
gpg --edit-key 03FC30EE, which will first display information about the public keys associated with this key.
gpg (GnuPG/MacGPG2) 2.0.30; Copyright (C) 2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Secret key is available. pub 4096R/03FC30EE created: 2016-12-07 expires: 2020-12-07 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate sub 4096R/17DA7011 created: 2016-12-07 expires: 2020-12-07 usage: E sub 4096R/0CBB0A5F created: 2016-12-07 expires: 2020-12-07 usage: S [ultimate] (1). Sam Schlinkert <email@example.com> gpg>
As Hudson writes: “GnuPG [the command line tool] is now waiting for another command from you. We need to switch to editing the secret key portion of this key with the
toggle command and then select the first non-primary key with the key command.” So I typed
toggle and got a result similar to what Hudson shows:
gpg> toggle sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never ssb 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never (1) Trammell Hudson <firstname.lastname@example.org> gpg>
At the next prompt, I entered
1 as instructed to select the second key listed, which is a subkey. (I assume
0 would select the first key listed.)
gpg> key 1 sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb* 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never ssb 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never (1) Trammell Hudson <email@example.com> gpg>
You can see we’ve selected the second key by the asterisk next to
ssb (the GnuPG manual notes: “The keyword sec identifies the private master signing key, and the keyword sbb identifies the private subordinates keys.”)
I then followed Hudson’s script: “Now we’ll run the
keytocard command to copy this key to the card.”
gpg> keytocard Signature key ....: none Encryption key....: none Authentication key: none Please select where to store the key: (2) Encryption key Your selection? 2
I’m assuming we only have one choice (“Encryption key”) presented to us here because the command line tool recognized that first subkey as the encryption key (as opposed to the signing subkey we made earlier).
After entering the passphrase for the key and the Admin PIN (which is
12345678 by default), I got something similar to what Hudson has:
sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb* 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never card-no: 0006 03036660 ssb 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never (1) Trammell Hudson <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Now we can sort see that that first subkey is on the card, since it says
card-no underneath it. Cool!
Now we need to get the second subkey (the signing key) to the card. As Hudson writes: first “deselect key 1, [then] select key 2 and upload the signing key”:
gpg> key 1 sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never card-no: 0006 03036660 ssb 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never (1) Trammell Hudson <email@example.com> gpg> key 2 sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never card-no: 0006 03036660 ssb* 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never (1) Trammell Hudson <firstname.lastname@example.org> gpg> keytocard Signature key ....: none Encryption key....: D04F 94C6 EF86 C150 9486 3F5C 2695 8563 FAFF ECA6 Authentication key: none Please select where to store the key: (1) Signature key (3) Authentication key Your selection? 1 You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "Trammell Hudson <email@example.com>" 2048-bit RSA key, ID A9057450, created 2014-11-16
We store this second key as the signature key.
Once you’ve done that you’ll see both keys are on the card:
sec 2048R/17DB29BE created: 2014-11-16 expires: 2018-11-16 ssb 2048R/FAFFECA6 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never card-no: 0006 03036660 ssb* 2048R/A9057450 created: 2014-11-16 expires: never card-no: 0006 03036660 (1) Trammell Hudson <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Now, writes Hudson, “Save the changes to the secret key on disk and exit gnupg:”
Set Hardware PINs
We also have to change both the PIN and the Admin PIN of our YubiKey to something other than the defaults. The default PIN (different than the Admin PIN) is
123456. The default Admin PIN is
Follow Hudson’s instructions on how to change both of them. The PIN has to be at least 6 digits. The Admin PIN has to be at least 8.
Note that the PIN will be what you enter to decrypt text and files with the key that’s on the YubiKey– not the passphrase (I found this strange and kind of a bummer, as I’m far better at remembering letters and words than solely digits, but it’s indeed explained in the GnuPG manual).
OK we’re in pretty good shape in achieving the goal I outline above (specificlaly the “mothership” procedure). Let’s pause and recap a bit.
OK What Did We Just Do?
As I understand we just moved an encrypting subkey and a signing subkey to the YubiKey. (I also think the “encrypting” subkey also does the decrypting.)
Those particular subkeys are no longer on my computer’s hard drive. One reason I believe that is because when I
gpg --edit-key 03FC30EE and then
toggle to see the private keys, the two subkeys have my card number on them. The other reason I think this is that if I encrypt text with a totally different key for my
03FC30EE key, I am unable to decrypt the message when the YubiKey is not inserted, but I am able to decrypt when it is inserted. Sweet!
Here’s the message I get when I try to decrypt without the YubiKey inserted:
Decrypt failed! Decrypt failed! (Card error) Code = 108
Now we get to the edge of my understanding. The question is what exactly gets left behind on my home computer thanks to doing the “mothership” procedure.
I think there’s something called a “master secret key” and I think it’s still on my home computer’s hard drive’s keyring.
Furthermore I think this means that I can still create other subkeys from this master key on my hard drive without my YubiKey plugged in, but I’m not sure. Among other things that means that (I think) I have to protect this particular computer as well as I protect my YubiKey. Maybe the “orphan” procedure would not have this problem, but it’s fine as long as I don’t have to protect any other devices I choose to use the subkeys on my YubiKey with.
Interestingly, with my YubiKey not inserted I can still encrypt messages with this key (though I can’t decrypt them). I believe this is because I still have a public subkey labeled
usage: E on my hard drive keyring (not on the card). I suppose I could delete (or revoke?) this key, but I’m a little weary of experimenting just now.
I should note here that an older tutorial from the Free Software Foundation Europe (FSFE) has a section called “Removing master key from the keyring”, implying that you could totally detach the computer you use to generate your keys and move them to your card/YubiKey from your card/YubiKey. Again, it’s not clear to me whether this is a better situation for me– I suppose it depends on my threat model with regard to this key, and whether I have at least one computer I can protect/trust.
Using the PGP key on my YubiKey while Using Other Computers
Now for another big test.
With the two subkeys on my new YubiKey, I headed into work to see if I could use my keys on a different computer with minimal setup. I needed to get the private key “stubs” on to the computer, so that they could point to the subkeys on my YubiKey. If the YubiKey was present, it would use the keys on my YubiKey. But if the YubiKey wasn’t inserted, it’d get that
Decrypt failed! (Card error) error.
After consulting this short GPGTools article, I learned that step one is to get your public key on to that computer’s key ring. I did this by emailing myself my new public key (unencrypted), and then opening the GPG Suite Keychain and importing the key. This is only because I did not want to upload this public key to any key server.
Once I got imported the public key and had it appear in GPG Suite Keychain (under “type” it says
pub, indicating it’s just the public key present), I plugged in my YubiKey and simply ran
gpg --card-status in the terminal, as per that GPGTools article. After a few seconds the terminal sent back some kind of success message that I forget now, and when I restarted the GPG Suite Keychain the key had
sec/pub as its “type”. I was then able to decrypt a message I had emailed myself, and was unable to decrypt it after I removed the YubiKey. Success!
Appendix A: Learning More About What I Did
Appendix B: Can I get my secret key off my YubiKey without it being present?
February 2018: One of my lingering questions after following these steps was what, exactly, remains on computers after I import the public key and run
gpg --card-status. I assumed that, once I unplug my YubiKey, the only key left is the public key. However, rather unnervingly, my GUI GPG applications said things like “The key has both a private and a public part”, even when my YubiKey was unplugged.
I hoped that this “private part” was simply a cryptographically useless “stub” of my secret key, and that the real secret key file was safe and sound on my unplugged YubiKey.
To test this, I devised the experiment below, which I ran on my new Linux machine. It seems like we’re safe from this basic attack.
Below is a step-by-step guide to test whether I could get a secret PGP key off of my YubiKey.
- On Computer 1, generate a GPG key pair.
- More your secret key to a YubiKey, following the instructions on this wedpage under “Generating the key on your local system”
- On computer 2, import the public key of the key pair.
- Still on computer 2, insert your YubiKey. Then create a stub for the secret key by running
- Unplug YubiKey.
- On computer 2, run
gpg --export-secret-keys -a KEYID > secret.asc, filling in the KEYID with the key id.
- A private key is now in the file
Question: is the key in
secret.asc the private key of the key pair? Did we just successfully get a secret key off of a YubiKey without it even being plugged in? Or is the key in the
secrets.asc merely some “stub” placeholder?
In an attempet to answer these questions, I took the following steps. I never plugged the YubiKey into the computer.
- On computer 2, with the YubiKey unplugged, run
mkdir export && cd export
gpg --export -a KEYID > public.asc
gpg --export-secret-keys -a KEYID > secret.asc
- Using a GUI application, delete key pair from this computer
- Import key pair from
- Encrypt a test file for this key pair:
gpg -e test.txt, then when prompted, enter KEYID
- Attempt to decrypt this file:
gpg -d test.txt.gpg
Thankfully, step 14 seems to fail with the following error:
gpg: public key decryption failed: Card error gpg: decryption failed: No secret key
which seems to mean the secret key we exported in step 6 is not the real secret key contained on the YubiKey.